Group-wide reputation can bond honest behavior even between strangers who rarely meet.

Evidence

Even in a community in which any particular pair of people meet rarely, it is still possible (as we show) for an individual’s reputation in the group as a whole to serve as a bond for his good and honest behavior toward each individual member. This illustrates the important fact that a reputation system may sometimes work only when it encompasses — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 4

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Pre-state trading communities sustained honesty through reputation systems backed by private judges. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 1; Community reputational enforcement works even without repeated bilateral interaction between traders. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 65; Widespread trust consists of pockets of dyadic relationships, not generalized sentiment

Related

• Pre-state trading communities sustained honesty through reputation systems backed by private judges. (similarity 0.85)
• Community reputational enforcement works even without repeated bilateral interaction between traders. (similarity 0.83)
• Reputation systems need cheap information flow, not frequent repeated trade, to enforce honesty. (similarity 0.82)
• Dense-group conditions are needed to start but not to sustain reputation regimes. (similarity 0.81)
• A trustworthy reputation can be exploited because it is imperfectly known (similarity 0.81)
• Reputational incentives, not only reciprocity, make thick relationships foster trust (similarity 0.79)
• Larger groups make cooperation harder to establish because reputational information spreads more thinly. (similarity 0.79)
• Widespread trust consists of pockets of dyadic relationships, not generalized sentiment (similarity 0.79)
• Generalized reciprocity emerges from frequent diverse interaction and boosts efficiency (similarity 0.79)
• Trustworthiness begets trust via reputation and repeated dealings (similarity 0.78)
• Costly information, not infrequent trade, is the core obstacle to honest exchange. (similarity 0.78)
• Trust requires repeated encounters, memory, costly honesty, and earned reputation (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Community reputational enforcement works even without repeated bilateral interaction between traders. #corroborates (0.90) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 65
• Widespread trust consists of pockets of dyadic relationships, not generalized sentiment #contradicts (0.78)