Community reputational enforcement works even without repeated bilateral interaction between traders.
Evidence
Our formal analysis verifies that it is not necessary for any pair of traders to interact frequently - that is, for traders to establish client relationships - in order for the boycott mechanism to be effective. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 65
Categorization
- XREF: Directly relevant to Gambetta’s private protection model — the enforcement group substitutes for the trust built up in one-on-one client relationships. — connects to: Unpublished arbitration still signals norms via industry gossip networks. — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 248; Pre-state trading communities sustained honesty through reputation systems backed by private judges. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 1; Group-wide reputation can bond honest behavior even between strangers who rarely meet. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 4 (+9 more)
Broader Connections
- Community boycotts can sustain cooperative trade as equilibrium without fixed trading partners.
#corroborates(0.90) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 57 - Reputation substitutes for formal enforcement in private trading clubs
#expands(0.85) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 43 - Reputation enforcement works even without formal arbitration because traders seek future club membership.
#expands(0.82) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 250 - Small communities enforce generalized reciprocity rather than one-on-one exchange
#expands(0.75) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 821 - Confinement to one community makes reputational sanctions powerful enough to guarantee repayment
#expands(0.72)