Affluent-proxy preferences understate the true gap between elites and ordinary citizens.
Evidence
Moreover, we must remember that in our analyses the preferences of the affluent are serving as proxies for those of truly wealthy Americans, who may well have more political clout than the affluent, and who tend to have policy preferences that differ more markedly from those of the average citizens. Thus even rather slight measured differences between preferences of the affluent and the median citizen may signal situations in which economic-elites want something quite different from most Americans and they generally get their way. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 105
Categorization
- XREF: Asymmetric proxy measurement aligns with the reader’s stress on operationalization quality in detecting control deficit. — connects to: Income-based policy preferences are estimated at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 51; U.S. policy outcomes contradict majority preferences whenever elites or organized interests disagree; Ideological consistency declines sharply from elites to mass publics — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 1962 (+4 more)
Related
- Most of the electorate does not conceptualize politics as elites do. (similarity 0.83)
- Measurement error in the affluent proxy biases elite influence estimates downward, not upward. (similarity 0.83)
- Ideological consistency declines sharply from elites to mass publics (similarity 0.82)
- Citizens can win policies without influencing them when elites agree. (similarity 0.81)
- Measurement limitations bias elite and interest-group influence estimates downward. (similarity 0.81)
- U.S. policy outcomes contradict majority preferences whenever elites or organized interests disagree (similarity 0.81)
- Average citizens have little independent influence on U.S. policy relative to economic elites. (similarity 0.81)
- General public opinion barely moves policy outcomes when elite preferences are held constant. (similarity 0.81)
- Correlated elite and mass preferences do not reflect citizen influence on policy. (similarity 0.80)
- Political elites hold ideologically organized beliefs while the mass public shows little constraint (similarity 0.80)
- Economic elites dominate US policy while average citizens exert little influence (similarity 0.79)
- Income-based policy preferences are estimated at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles. (similarity 0.78)
- Average citizens have almost no independent influence over U.S. policy. (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Ideological consistency declines sharply from elites to mass publics
#corroborates(0.85) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 1962 - Elite ideologies are sharply distinct while mass bases blur together indistinguishably
#corroborates(0.85) - Most of the electorate does not conceptualize politics as elites do.
#corroborates(0.82) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 1897 - Political elites hold ideologically organized beliefs while the mass public shows little constraint
#corroborates(0.80) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 1921 - Mass publics hold more logical inconsistencies than political elites do.
#corroborates(0.80)