Counter-jihad movements are grounded in contingent local grievances more than a unitary Islam.

Evidence

Instead, the idea of Islam as a hostile, ‘alien’ culture has been important, and it is often refracted through specific, local experiences. For instance, the EDL grew out of the United People of Luton, a local protest group set up in response to a demonstration by offshoots of Al Muhajiroun, which had protested a homecoming parade by the Royal Anglian Regiment in Luton town centre. The first Pegida protests were organized after the movement’s founder witnessed an anti-ISIS demonstration by supporters of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) in Dresden city centre, which he saw as symptomatic of the importation of ‘foreign’ religious conflicts into Germany. Stop Islamization of America gained international notoriety through organizing protests against the Park 51 development (popularly known as the ‘Ground Zero Mosque’), a proposed Muslim community centre near the former site of the World Trade Center, which opponents claimed was being built on ‘hallowed ground’. The importance of these specific, local conditions is one reason why organizational models and tactics developed in one context do not always translate to other, dissimilar contexts. — A. Hussain, N. Meer, Framing Muslim Integration, 533

Categorization

• QUESTION: Worth noting how local grounding undermines the Runnymede ‘closed views’ model that treats Islamophobia as a single worldview — local contingency complicates any single comprehensive definition.
• XREF: Connects to the reader’s definitional-camp mapping: this local-contingency framing sits against Bleich’s generalizable concept-formation. — connects to: Counter-jihad mobilization is not explained by economic crisis or jihadist violence. — A. Hussain, N. Meer, Framing Muslim Integration, 532; Counter-jihad mobilizations are triggered by local cultural anxieties, not national crises — Runnymede Trust (ed. Farah Elahi & Omar Khan), Islamophobia: Still a Challenge for Us…, 528; Islamist groups arise from local conditions, not from anti-American plots — Deepa Kumar, Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire, 376 (+3 more)

Related

• Counter-jihad mobilizations are triggered by local cultural anxieties, not national crises (similarity 0.93)
• Counter-jihad mobilization is not explained by economic crisis or jihadist violence. (similarity 0.88)
• Counter-jihad mobilization is not driven by economic crisis or jihadist violence (similarity 0.88)
• Anti-Islam mobilization forms a transnational organized political movement, not mere prejudice. (similarity 0.84)
• Anti-Muslim mobilizations form a transnational movement with distinct ideology and policy reach. (similarity 0.84)
• European counter-jihadism spans both populist parties and street movements. (similarity 0.82)
• Islamist groups are locally shaped and resist homogenizing categorization (similarity 0.81)
• A coordinated international counter-jihad movement shares strategies across borders (similarity 0.80)
• Counter-jihad campaigns have spread across Western countries and infected mainstream politics. (similarity 0.80)
• The counterjihad movement moves ideas and money across the Atlantic (similarity 0.79)
• Counter-jihad ideology frames Islam as a hostile alien culture invading the west (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Counter-jihad mobilizations are triggered by local cultural anxieties, not national crises #corroborates (0.90) — Runnymede Trust (ed. Farah Elahi & Omar Khan), Islamophobia, 528
• Counter-jihad mobilization is not driven by economic crisis or jihadist violence #corroborates (0.80) — Runnymede Trust (ed. Farah Elahi & Omar Khan), Islamophobia, 527
• Islamist groups arise from local conditions, not from anti-American plots #corroborates (0.75) — Deepa Kumar, Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire, 376
• Anti-Muslim sentiment operates independently of local political ideology #contradicts (0.70)
• Anti-Muslim mobilizations form a transnational movement with distinct ideology and policy reach. #contradicts (0.70) — A. Hussain, N. Meer, Framing Muslim Integration, 545