Anti-Islam mobilization forms a transnational organized political movement, not mere prejudice.

Evidence

The early years of the 21st century have seen an extraordinary proliferation of political mobilizations against Islam in many European and North American countries, including campaigns against the building of mosques and minarets, and for imposing ‘burqa bans’. This shows that anxiety about the place of Islam in ‘western’ societies transcends national boundaries. Furthermore many actors involved in these campaigns have built extensive international networks, and have long been sharing organizational models, strategies, tactics and resources. Significantly, many right-wing political parties, protest movements and advocacy groups across Europe and North America have come to view themselves as part of a transnational ‘counter-jihad’ movement dedicated to resisting what they perceive as the ‘Islamization of the west’. This sphere of activity goes beyond casual prejudice or bigotry towards Muslims: it is grounded in a developed political ideology, supported by a complex organizational infrastructure, and goes far beyond simply issuing Islamophobic pronouncements. — A. Hussain, N. Meer, Framing Muslim Integration, 515

The early years of the 21st century have seen an extraordinary proliferation of political mobilizations against Islam in many European and North American countries, including campaigns against the building of mosques and minarets, and for imposing ‘burqa bans’. This shows that anxiety about the place of Islam in ‘western’ societies transcends national boundaries. Furthermore many actors involved in these campaigns have built extensive international networks, and have long been sharing organizational models, strategies, tactics and resources. Significantly, many right-wing political parties, protest movements and advocacy groups across Europe and North America have come to view themselves as part of a transnational ‘counter-jihad’ movement dedicated to resisting what they perceive as the ‘Islamization of the west’. This sphere of activity goes beyond casual prejudice or bigotry towards Muslims: it is grounded in a developed political ideology, supported by a complex organizational infrastructure, and goes far beyond simply issuing Islamophobic pronouncements. — Runnymede Trust (ed. Farah Elahi & Omar Khan), Islamophobia, 510

Categorization

• DEFINE: Frames the chapter’s ‘counter-jihad’ concept as a developed ideology with organizational infrastructure, a key definitional move distinguishing it from casual Islamophobia.
• XREF: Connects to the contested-Islamophobia-definition debate: this passage takes the view that the phenomenon is systemic and ideological rather than merely attitudinal — implicitly countering Bleich’s neutral attitudinal concept. — connects to: Anti-Muslim mobilizations form a transnational movement with distinct ideology and policy reach. — A. Hussain, N. Meer, Framing Muslim Integration, 545; Anti-Muslim sentiment operates independently of local political ideology; Anti-Muslim sentiment spans opposing political groups, not just white conservatives (+7 more)
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — A. Hussain, N. Meer, Framing Muslim Integration, 515; Runnymede Trust (ed. Farah Elahi & Omar Khan), Islamophobia: Still a Challenge for Us…, 510

Related

• Anti-Muslim mobilizations form a transnational movement with distinct ideology and policy reach. (similarity 0.93)
• Counter-jihad campaigns have spread across Western countries and infected mainstream politics. (similarity 0.88)
• The counterjihad movement moves ideas and money across the Atlantic (similarity 0.86)
• Counter-jihad mobilizations are triggered by local cultural anxieties, not national crises (similarity 0.86)
• A coordinated international counter-jihad movement shares strategies across borders (similarity 0.86)
• European counter-jihadism spans both populist parties and street movements. (similarity 0.85)
• Counter-jihad movements are grounded in contingent local grievances more than a unitary Islam. (similarity 0.84)
• Counter-jihad mobilization is not driven by economic crisis or jihadist violence (similarity 0.84)
• European Islamophobia has moved from the far right into the political mainstream. (similarity 0.83)
• Counter-jihad mobilization is not explained by economic crisis or jihadist violence. (similarity 0.82)
• Islamophobia predates organized networks and serves structural functions across the political spectrum (similarity 0.81)
• Grassroots counter-mobilization partially defeated the Islamophobia network in the mosque fight (similarity 0.81)
• Islamophobia is produced by an interconnected network of institutional spheres, not isolated actors (similarity 0.81)
• Islamism spans violent and peaceful movements rather than one uniform threat. (similarity 0.81)
• War on Terror Islamophobia empowered populist demagogues to seize power against Muslims (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• Anti-Muslim mobilizations form a transnational movement with distinct ideology and policy reach. #corroborates (0.95) — A. Hussain, N. Meer, Framing Muslim Integration, 545
• Islamophobia is political rather than religious and must be fought politically #corroborates (0.90) — Deepa Kumar, Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire, 576
• Anti-Muslim sentiment operates independently of local political ideology #contradicts (0.85)
• Anti-Muslim sentiment spans opposing political groups, not just white conservatives #expands (0.85)
• A well-funded network of professional Islamophobes drives anti-Muslim activism in America #corroborates (0.85) — Green, Todd H, The Fear of Islam_ An Introduction to…, 446
• Counter-jihad mobilization is not driven by economic crisis or jihadist violence #corroborates (0.80) — Runnymede Trust (ed. Farah Elahi & Omar Khan), Islamophobia, 527
• Right-wing Islamophobes are inside the establishment, not fringe infiltrators #corroborates (0.80) — Deepa Kumar, Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire, 536
• Islam in America operates as a political identity of otherness beyond religion #expands (0.75) — Khaled A. Beydoun, American Islamophobia_ Understanding…, 69
• Counter-jihad mobilizations are triggered by local cultural anxieties, not national crises #corroborates (0.75) — Runnymede Trust (ed. Farah Elahi & Omar Khan), Islamophobia, 528