Counter-jihad mobilization is not explained by economic crisis or jihadist violence.

Evidence

The international proliferation of political mobilizations against Islam, like the international growth of farright activism more generally, is sometimes seen as a consequence of the post-2008 global economic crisis, or as a direct response to jihadist violence. However, many of the counter-jihad groups formed long before the economic crisis, and some of their most successful mobilizations have occurred in times and places where the threat of jihadist violence had seemed to be receding. When the EDL was formed in 2009, the July 2005 London bombings were four years in the past, while the implementation of fiscal austerity still lay in the future. When Pegida mobilized in late 2014, it did so in a country where there had been no recent jihadist terror attacks and where the economy was growing. — A. Hussain, N. Meer, Framing Muslim Integration, 532

Categorization

• DEEPTHINKING: A tight empirical challenge to two intuitive causal stories at once; the dated counterexample logic (EDL in 2009, Pegida in 2014) is a model of how to knock down a narrative with a timeline.
• XREF: connects to: Counter-jihad mobilization is not driven by economic crisis or jihadist violence — Runnymede Trust (ed. Farah Elahi & Omar Khan), Islamophobia: Still a Challenge for Us…, 527; Counter-jihad mobilizations are triggered by local cultural anxieties, not national crises — Runnymede Trust (ed. Farah Elahi & Omar Khan), Islamophobia: Still a Challenge for Us…, 528; Counter-jihad movements are grounded in contingent local grievances more than a unitary Islam. — A. Hussain, N. Meer, Framing Muslim Integration, 533

Related

• Counter-jihad mobilization is not driven by economic crisis or jihadist violence (similarity 0.97)
• Counter-jihad movements are grounded in contingent local grievances more than a unitary Islam. (similarity 0.88)
• Counter-jihad mobilizations are triggered by local cultural anxieties, not national crises (similarity 0.87)
• Anti-Islam mobilization forms a transnational organized political movement, not mere prejudice. (similarity 0.82)
• Counter-jihad campaigns have spread across Western countries and infected mainstream politics. (similarity 0.82)
• European counter-jihadism spans both populist parties and street movements. (similarity 0.81)
• Anti-Muslim mobilizations form a transnational movement with distinct ideology and policy reach. (similarity 0.80)
• The counterjihad movement moves ideas and money across the Atlantic (similarity 0.79)
• A coordinated international counter-jihad movement shares strategies across borders (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Counter-jihad mobilization is not driven by economic crisis or jihadist violence #corroborates (0.98) — Runnymede Trust (ed. Farah Elahi & Omar Khan), Islamophobia, 527
• Counter-jihad mobilizations are triggered by local cultural anxieties, not national crises #expands (0.82) — Runnymede Trust (ed. Farah Elahi & Omar Khan), Islamophobia, 528
• Counter-jihad movements are grounded in contingent local grievances more than a unitary Islam. #expands (0.80) — A. Hussain, N. Meer, Framing Muslim Integration, 533