States respond to perceived cultural-ideological threats, not raw power balances

Evidence

Broadly speaking, states can react in one or a combination of two ways to the rise of a new power. Alone or in coalition with other states they can attempt to insure their security by balancing against the emerging power, containing it, and, if necessary, going to war to defeat it. Alternatively, states can try to bandwagon with the emerging power, accommodating it, and assuming a secondary or subordinate position in relation to the emerging power with the expectation that their core interests will be protected. Or, conceivably, states could attempt some mixture of balancing and bandwagoning, although this runs the risk of both antagonizing the rising power and having no protection against it. According to Western international relations theory, balancing is usually a more desirable option and in fact has been more frequently resorted to than bandwagoning. — Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the…, 631 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: No realist theory explains why states perceive some powers but not others as threats — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 61; Perceived cultural-value threats often outweigh economic ones in anti-immigrant bias. — Blake M. Riek, Eric W. Mania, and Samuel L. Gaertner, Intergroup Threat and Outgroup…, 39; Cultural seduction was feared more than state hostility by Khomeini (+9 more)

Broader Connections

• States respond to rising powers by either balancing against or bandwagoning with them. #complicates (0.82) — Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the…, 631