Counter-jihad mobilization is not driven by economic crisis or jihadist violence

Evidence

The international proliferation of political mobilizations against Islam, like the international growth of farright activism more generally, is sometimes seen as a consequence of the post-2008 global economic crisis, or as a direct response to jihadist violence. However, many of the counter-jihad groups formed long before the economic crisis, and some of their most successful mobilizations have occurred in times and places where the threat of jihadist violence had seemed to be receding. When the EDL was formed in 2009, the July 2005 London bombings were four years in the past, while the implementation of fiscal austerity still lay in the future. When Pegida mobilized in late 2014, it did so in a country where there had been no recent jihadist terror attacks and where the economy was growing. — Runnymede Trust (ed. Farah Elahi & Omar Khan), Islamophobia, 527

Categorization

  • XREF: This directly contradicts the common causal framing that Islamophobia spikes with terror attacks or economic downturn — relevant to how this report positions its analysis against rival explanations in the field. — connects to: Anti-Islam mobilization forms a transnational organized political movement, not mere prejudice. — A. Hussain, N. Meer, Framing Muslim Integration, 515; Counter-jihad mobilization is not explained by economic crisis or jihadist violence. — A. Hussain, N. Meer, Framing Muslim Integration, 532; Counter-jihad movements are grounded in contingent local grievances more than a unitary Islam. — A. Hussain, N. Meer, Framing Muslim Integration, 533 (+2 more)

Broader Connections