Common law rules arise from comparing cases, not from tracing prior logic

Evidence

Consequently, the common law process is not one of simply tracing the logical consequences of preexisting rules stated in the precedents. As Edward H. Levi put it, “(t]he rules change as the rules are applied. More important, the rules arise from a process which, while comparing fact situations, creates the rules and then applies them.” — Burton, Steven J, An Introduction to Law and Legal…, 222

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Clarifies the actual mechanism of common law: rules are generated and revised through fact comparison, not deduced from fixed prior rules.
  • XREF: Echoes the ch. 44 ideal-vs-practice contrast and connects to Karl Llewellyn and legal realism. — connects to: Inductive generalization derives universal legal rules from repeated particular case outcomes — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 546; Legal analogy argues from particular facts to particular consequences based on similarities — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 547; Analogical reasoning infers additional properties from shared case similarities — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 570 (+40 more)
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Burton, Steven J, An Introduction to Law and Legal…, 222

Broader Connections