Legal analogy requires a theoretical basis rather than mere perception

Evidence

However, the legal use of analogy is more like the scientific use than the ordinary use in the following sense: that the claim that X and Y are analogous is made with respect to some theoretical basis. The appeal is not (at least wholly) to perception. Rather the theoretical basis (in law, certain conventional rules of relevance established as precedents) gives us a decision procedure for determining whether or not cases X and Y are indeed analogous. — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 608

Categorization

  • XREF: XREF names what this plausibly connects to; SEED sketches the article/essay angle. — connects to: Legal analogy argues from particular facts to particular consequences based on similarities — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 547; Analogical reasoning fails when negative factual resemblances outweigh positive resemblances — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 593; Valid legal analogies depend on relevant similarities rather than case quantities — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 343 (+17 more)
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 608

Library Connections

Broader Connections