Legal reasoning reduces to the judge drawing distinctions and the lawyer predicting them
Evidence
The law then is reduced, in the case of the judge, to the art of drawing distinctions, and in the case of the lawyer, to the art of anticipating the distinctions the judge is likely to draw. — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 1301
Categorization
- DEFINE: Defines the division of labor in analogical reasoning between judge and advocate.
- XREF: Connects to legal writing’s audience analysis and to prediction memos. — connects to: Advocates debate whether case factual similarities are legally material — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 581; Legal analogy requires a theoretical basis rather than mere perception — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 608; Common-law principles help judges determine if case differences are significant — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 715 (+11 more)
- corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 1301
Broader Connections
- Common law rules arise from comparing cases, not from tracing prior logic
#expands(0.65) — Burton, Steven J, An Introduction to Law and Legal…, 222 - Valid legal analogies depend on relevant similarities rather than case quantities
#expands(0.50) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 343 - Legal reasoning employs both deductive and inductive processes iteratively.
#qualifies(0.40) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 312