Persuasion by past reasoning is not the same as obeying precedent.

Evidence

With respect to the former, which is not really precedential reasoning at all, the instant court may learn from a previous case, or be persuaded by some decision in the past, but the decision to do what another court has done on an earlier occasion is not based on the previous case’s status as a precedent. Instead the decision exemplifies the fundamental human capacity to learn from others and from the past. There are many instances in which the instant court will be persuaded by the reasoning of another court, but if the instant court is genuinely persuaded, then it is not relying on-obeyingprecedent at all.’ To see why this is so, consider a simple nonlegal example: Suppose I am boiling an egg. I boil it for six minutes, and am pleased to discover that it is cooked to precisely my preferred hardness. Consequently, the next time I boil an egg I do so, not surprisingly, for six minutes. I have learned from the previous “case,” but when I boil the second egg for six minutes, I am not boiling it for six minutes because I boiled it for six minutes on the previous occasion. I am boiling it for six minutes because six minutes is the right time. I know this because I have learned from the previous action, but on subsequent occasions I make the decision because of what I then know. — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 66

Categorization

• DEFINE: Sharpens the definition of precedential reasoning by distinguishing it from ordinary learning-from-experience, exemplified by the egg-boiling analogy.
• XREF: Connects to the distinction between authority-based and reason-based justification, a theme in political philosophy and Weber’s typologies of authority. — connects to: Obeying rules, precedent, and authority means deciding against one’s own best judgment. — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 15; Following precedent is treated as a fallacy outside of law. — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 73; Precedent constrains outcomes while analogy merely supports arguments — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 162 (+10 more)

Related

• Precedent constrains outcomes while analogy merely supports arguments (similarity 0.88)
• Following precedent is treated as a fallacy outside of law. (similarity 0.86)
• A binding precedent obliges courts to follow it or distinguish it. (similarity 0.83)
• Precedent expresses a universal human need for predictability, not a common-law peculiarity (similarity 0.82)
• Stare decisis requires treating prior decisions as binding regardless of perceived correctness. (similarity 0.82)
• Obeying rules, precedent, and authority means deciding against one’s own best judgment. (similarity 0.81)
• Precedent obliges judges to follow cases they believe were wrongly decided. (similarity 0.80)
• A judicial precedent attaches specific legal consequences to detailed case facts. (similarity 0.79)
• Legal analogy argues from particular facts to particular consequences based on similarities (similarity 0.79)
• A case is precedent only when material facts match exactly (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Precedent constrains outcomes while analogy merely supports arguments #expands (0.55) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 162
• Legal analogy argues from particular facts to particular consequences based on similarities #expands (0.50) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 547
• Common law rules arise from comparing cases, not from tracing prior logic #expands (0.50) — Burton, Steven J, An Introduction to Law and Legal…, 222
• Stated precedent rules often fail to determine later case outcomes #expands (0.50) — Burton, Steven J, An Introduction to Law and Legal…, 216
• Legal and non-legal deciders draw on different but overlapping argument forms. #expands (0.45) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 496