Judicial rules should not be applied to dryly logical extremes

Evidence

Cardozo rejected this analysis, describing it as an “extension of a maxim or a definition with relentless disregard of consequences to ‘a dryly logical extreme.’ The approximate and relative become the definite and absolute.” — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 144

Categorization

• XREF: XREF Cardozo mechanical jurisprudence Hynes case — connects to: Legal reasoning yields probability rather than absolute mathematical truths — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 242; Inductive legal generalization produces workable probabilities rather than absolute truths. — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 339; Appeals to pity are fallacious when the question is purely factual — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 1039 (+13 more)
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 144

Broader Connections

• Inductive legal generalization produces workable probabilities rather than absolute truths. #corroborates (0.75) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 339
• Legal reasoning yields probability rather than absolute mathematical truths #corroborates (0.70) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 242
• Common law rules arise from comparing cases, not from tracing prior logic #corroborates (0.60) — Burton, Steven J, An Introduction to Law and Legal…, 222
• Legal analogy requires a theoretical basis rather than mere perception #expands (0.45) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 608