Rules without concrete instances are meaningless hindrances

Evidence

We have discovered in our teaching of the law that general propositions are empty. We have discovered that students who come eager to learn the rules and who do learn them, and who learn nothing more, will take away the shell and not the substance. We have discovered that rules alone, mere forms of words, are worthless. We have learned that the concrete instance, the heaping up of concrete instances, the present, vital memory of a multitude of concrete instances, is necessary in order to make any general proposition, be it rule of law or any other, mean anything at all. Without the concrete instances the general proposition is baggage, impedimenta, stuff about the feet. It not only does not help. It hinders. — Burton, Steven J, An Introduction to Law and Legal…, 148

Categorization

• SEED: An essay angle: the same principle undermines abstract legal/regulatory writing across fields — macro regulations that never cite a concrete case are dead letters.
• XREF: Connects to Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox and to cognitive science showing examples drive concept formation more than definitions. — connects to: Judicial rules should not be applied to dryly logical extremes — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 144; Common law rules arise from comparing cases, not from tracing prior logic — Burton, Steven J, An Introduction to Law and Legal…, 222; Stated precedent rules often fail to determine later case outcomes — Burton, Steven J, An Introduction to Law and Legal…, 216 (+25 more)
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Burton, Steven J, An Introduction to Law and Legal…, 148

Library Connections

• Stated precedent rules often fail to determine later case outcomes #complicates (0.60) — Burton, Steven J, An Introduction to Law and Legal…, 216

Broader Connections

• Common law rules arise from comparing cases, not from tracing prior logic #expands (0.65) — Burton, Steven J, An Introduction to Law and Legal…, 222
• Common law adjudication cycles induction and deduction into new rules #expands (0.65) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 168
• Judicial rules should not be applied to dryly logical extremes #exemplifies (0.60) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 144
• Language requires general terms that cannot be explained purely by particulars #contradicts (0.45) — Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 587