Commitments, promises, and threats all reduce a player’s own payoffs visibly and irreversibly

Evidence

The first point to observe is that a commitment, a promise, or a threat can usually be characterized in a fashion equivalent to the following: to make one of these moves, a player selectively reduces—visibly and irreversibly—some of his own payoffs in the matrix. This is what the move amounts to. {81} We could also say that one openly selects a strategy in advance for responding to the other’s choice; but more than selection is required. The player must invoke penalty on his own failure to pursue subsequently the particular strategy of response that he has selected beforehand. And to invoke a penalty on failure to follow a strategy is mathematically equivalent to subtracting the amount of the penalty from one’s own payoffs in all cells that do not correspond to the strategy so selected. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 347

Categorization

• DEFINE: A compact formal definition: every strategic move is a self-imposed visible penalty, reducible to subtracting payoffs from one’s own cells.
• XREF: Directly instantiates Gambetta’s model of private protection where the Mafia’s credibility rests on self-binding visible commitments; also Schelling’s own hostage concept — Corleone taking on a debt of honor functions exactly as a self-reduced payoff. — connects to: Even a player sure of his own restraint inherits the other’s amplified fears — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 471; One player’s promise can worsen the other player’s position — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 787; Commitment includes removing options, delegating fulfilment, and self-handicapping — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 300 (+4 more)

Related

• Threats, promises, and commitments unify as payoff-restricting reaction functions (similarity 0.86)
• Threats only matter when players can irreversibly change the game (similarity 0.86)
• One player’s promise can worsen the other player’s position (similarity 0.86)
• Commitment includes removing options, delegating fulfilment, and self-handicapping (similarity 0.85)
• Strategic moves work by constraining one’s own behavior to shape an opponent’s expectations. (similarity 0.82)
• Even a player sure of his own restraint inherits the other’s amplified fears (similarity 0.81)
• Irreversible commitments force the enemy, not oneself, to be the one who yields. (similarity 0.80)
• Committing to a strategy can yield a better outcome than remaining uncommitted (similarity 0.80)
• Commitment buys first move while threat commits to a second-move response strategy (similarity 0.79)
• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Threats and promises are meaningless in zero-sum games #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 204
• Strategic moves work by constraining one’s own behavior to shape an opponent’s expectations. #corroborates (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 361
• Commitments are often manufactured by removing one’s own control over action #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 714