A rule differs from an order, among other ways, by being normative, by setting a standard of behavior that has a call on its subject beyond the threat that may enforce it. A rule can never be binding just because some person with physical power wants it to be so. He must have authority to issue the rule or it is no rule, and such authority can only come from another rule which is already binding on those to whom he speaks. That is the difference between a valid law and the orders of a gunman.
Evidence
A rule can never be binding just because some person with physical power wants it to be so. He must have authority to issue the rule or it is no rule, and such authority can only come from another rule which is already binding on those to whom he speaks. That is the difference between a valid law and the orders of a gunman. — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 48 (
#corroborates, via linked claim)
Austin had said that every rule is a general command, and that a person is obligated under a rule if he is liable to be hurt should he disobey it. Hart points out that this obliterates the distinction between being obliged to do something and being obligated to do it. If one is bound by a rule he is obligated, not merely obliged, to do what it provides, and therefore being bound by a rule must be different from being subject to an injury if one disobeys an order. A rule differs from an order, among other ways, by being normative, by setting a standard of behavior that has a call on its subject beyond the threat that may enforce it. — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 47 (
#corroborates, via linked claim)
Categorization
- corroborated: 3 independent passages support this claim
- XREF: connects to: Day in and day out we send people to jail, or take money away from them, or make them do things they do not want to do, under coercion of force, and we justify all of this by speaking of such persons as having broken the law or having failed to meet their legal obligations, or having interfered with other people’s legal rights. Even in clear cases (a bank robber or a willful breach of contract), when we are confident that someone had a legal obligation and broke it, we are not able to give a satisfactory account of what that means, or why that entitles the state to punish or coerce him. We may feel confident that what we are doing is proper, but until we can identify the principles we are following we cannot be sure that they are sufficient, or whether we are applying them consistently. In less clear cases, when the issue of whether an obligation has been broken is for some reason controversial, the pitch of these nagging questions rises, and our responsibility to find answers deepens.; So Hart offers a general theory of rules that does not make their authority depend upon the physical power of their authors. If we examine the way different rules come into being, he tells us, and attend to the distinction between primary and secondary rules, we see that there are two possible sources of a rule’s authority. (a) A rule may become binding upon a group of people because that group through its practices accepts the rule as a standard for its conduct. It is not enough that the group simply conforms to a pattern of behavior: even though most Englishmen may go to the movies on Saturday evening, they have not accepted a rule requiring that they do so. A practice constitutes the acceptance of a rule only when those who follow the practice regard the rule as binding, and recognize the rule as a reason or justification for their own behavior and as a reason for criticizing the behavior of others who do not obey it.; Legal obligation differs from mere coercion by threat of force — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 40 (+6 more)
Related
- Legal validity derives from normative authority, not from physical power alone. (similarity 0.88)
- Hart points out that Austin’s view that every rule is a general command obliterates the distinction between being obliged to do something and being obligated to do it. If one is bound by a rule he… (similarity 0.88)
- Normative obligation differs fundamentally from being threatened into compliance. (similarity 0.87)
- Can we say that we have, in principle at least, the same reasons for meeting our legal obligations that we have for meeting our moral obligations? (similarity 0.83)
- Rule by decree severs justification from principle, making power itself the source of law. (similarity 0.81)
- Legal obligation differs from mere coercion by threat of force (similarity 0.80)
- Authority builds from accumulated past compliance without requiring ongoing justification (similarity 0.79)
- Day in and day out we send people to jail, or take money away from them, or make them do things they do not want to do, under coercion of force, and we justify all of this by speaking of such… (similarity 0.79)
- Unlawful power is real, not a mere negatable possibility (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Legal validity derives from normative authority, not from physical power alone.
#corroborates(0.90) — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 48 - So Hart offers a general theory of rules that does not make their authority depend upon the physical power of their authors. If we examine the way different rules come into being, he tells us, and…
#expands(0.85) - Normative obligation differs fundamentally from being threatened into compliance.
#corroborates(0.85) — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 47 - Legal obligation differs from mere coercion by threat of force
#corroborates(0.80) — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 40 - Hart points out that Austin’s view that every rule is a general command obliterates the distinction between being obliged to do something and being obligated to do it. If one is bound by a rule he…
#expands(0.70) - Primary rules impose duties while secondary rules confer public or private powers
#expands(0.60) — HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law…, 288