Publicly known reluctance to strike first paradoxically deters the enemy.
Evidence
As General Leslie R. Groves remarked in a speech, “If Russia knows we won’t attack first, the Kremlin will be very much less apt to attack us…Our reluctance to strike first is a military disadvantage to us; but it is also, paradoxically, a factor in preventing a world conflict today.” — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 525
Categorization
- XREF: The payoff of a known commitment — the Godfather-bond as pre-commitment — maps onto Schelling’s own credibility logic here. — connects to: Preclusive self-defense can itself provoke the attack it tries to avert — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 461; A deterrence threat often hurts the threatener as much as the threatened — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 32; Weapons designed for first strike destabilize deterrence by inviting preemption. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 547 (+2 more)
Related
- Preclusive self-defense can itself provoke the attack it tries to avert (similarity 0.80)
- Weapons designed for first strike destabilize deterrence by inviting preemption. (similarity 0.79)
Broader Connections
- A deterrence threat often hurts the threatener as much as the threatened
#expands(0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 32 - Fear of civil war paradoxically protected Siyad by paralyzing his enemies
#exemplifies(0.80) — I.M. Lewis, I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali_ Nation…, 611 - A false belief that Gaullists would strike first drove rival conspirators to escalate.
#exemplifies(0.80) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 861 - Weapons designed for first strike destabilize deterrence by inviting preemption.
#contradicts(0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 547