Threats fail against irrational adversaries and trapped opponents

Evidence

We have observed that the rationality of the adversary is pertinent to the efficacy of a threat, and that madmen, like small children, can often not be controlled by threats. We have recognized that the efficacy of the threat may depend on what alternatives are available to the potential enemy, who, if he is not to react like a trapped lion, must be left some tolerable recourse. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 23

Categorization

• XREF: The ‘trapped lion’ and ‘irrational adversary’ constraints map onto why the Mafia must leave victims tolerable recourse rather than pure coercion — a limitation on brute force enforcement. — connects to: Obscure symbolic threats minimize exposure while maximizing terror; A losing side rationally abandons containment for deliberate risk-creation. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 431; A deterrence threat often hurts the threatener as much as the threatened — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 32 (+3 more)

Related

• Selecting visibly irrational agents can make threats credible (similarity 0.80)
• A deterrence threat often hurts the threatener as much as the threatened (similarity 0.79)
• Deterrence rests on surviving retaliation capacity, not on existing destructive capacity. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Selecting visibly irrational agents can make threats credible #contradicts (0.95) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 332
• A deterrence threat often hurts the threatener as much as the threatened #complicates (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 32
• Deterrence works only when fighters can reliably predict battle outcomes #expands (0.75)