Trust in economic life arises from social relations rather than morality or institutions alone.

Evidence

Granovetter argues that social relations and the obligations inherent in them, rather than generalized morality (the oversocialized conception) or institutional arrangements like contracts or authority structures (the undersocialized conception), “are mainly responsible” for the production of trust in economic life (p. 491). — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 8

Categorization

• DEFINE: Distinguishes oversocialized (generalized morality) and undersocialized (institutions) conceptions of trust production from the embedded-relations view.
• XREF: Connects to Granovetter’s embeddedness literature and Simmel’s triad framework resonating with the Raskolnikov reading purpose. — connects to: Social relations are sufficient but not necessary conditions for trust in economic life.; Social order can emerge from distrust rather than trust. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 784; Trust can arise even when transactions are not embedded in social relations. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 12 (+4 more)

Related

• Social relations are sufficient but not necessary conditions for trust in economic life. (similarity 0.95)
• Trust can arise even when transactions are not embedded in social relations. (similarity 0.91)
• Trust flourishes most where neither kinship nor contract obligations apply (similarity 0.84)
• Social relations enable malfeasance on a larger scale than their absence does. (similarity 0.83)
• Economic institutions depend on personal networks that generate trust and enforce norms (similarity 0.83)
• Trust emerges from gradually escalated reciprocal exchanges in ongoing relationships (similarity 0.83)
• Economic transactions are governed by their embeddedness in social networks (similarity 0.83)
• Trust is a social relationship of investing responsibility in another for uncertain future return. (similarity 0.82)
• Trust is defined as delegating authority for uncertain future returns (similarity 0.82)
• Trust should be a by-product of good institutions, not their precondition (similarity 0.82)
• Rational trust requires both trusted’s incentives and truster’s knowledge (similarity 0.82)
• Trust alone cannot explain modern social order. (similarity 0.81)
• Trust is conceived both as one societal element and as social order itself (similarity 0.81)
• Defining trust requires grounding it in mutual dependency relations (similarity 0.81)
• Trust relationships self-maintain once the parties recognize mutual benefit (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• Trust can arise even when transactions are not embedded in social relations. #contradicts (0.80) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 12
• Social order can emerge from distrust rather than trust. #complicates (0.75) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 784
• Trust is a result rather than a precondition of cooperation #corroborates (0.72) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2781
• Trust requires belief in the other’s motivations, not mere behavioral expectation #expands (0.72)
• Moral trust requires temporally stable social contexts to operate #expands (0.72)
• Trust should be a by-product of good institutions, not their precondition #complicates (0.70) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2773