Massu publicly declared the army would not obey de Gaulle when still loyal

Evidence

When asked what the army’s principal concern was, Massu, according to Kempski, replied: “That the government should help us to see the future clearly, in order that we can succeed in maintaining Algérie française.” From there on Massu waxed warmer and warmer in his criticism of de Gaulle: “We no longer understand the policy of President de Gaulle. The army could not have anticipated that he would adopt such a policy…. Our greatest disillusion has been to see General de Gaulle become a man of the Left.” When the German pointed out that “It was, after all, you and your friends who brought him back to power,” Massu replied bitterly: “De Gaulle was the only man available. Perhaps the army made a mistake.” Finally, when asked whether the army would obey, Massu was quoted as declaring: “Myself, and the majority of officers in a position of command, will not execute unconditionally the orders of the Head of State.” — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1088 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

At Challe’s headquarters five generals and eleven field officers from General Crépin downwards told Debré flatly that the army would not fire on the barricades. It was Colonel Argoud who dotted the is by declaring that the only possible solution was for de Gaulle to renounce “self-determination”; otherwise he would be replaced by General Challe. Upon which, Debré expostulated to Delouvrier, “But you have a soviet of colonels here!” — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1104 (#exemplifies, via linked claim)

The objectives of the “ultras” were, as before, short-term and shortsighted. Ortiz aimed, immediately, for a replay of 13 May 1958, but this time ending with a total and irreversible victory for the pieds noirs. (Susini, characteristically, went even further, declaring to the F.N.F.: “The hour to overturn the regime has struck. The revolution will start in Algiers and move to Paris.”) By taking up positions in arms in the heart of Algiers, Ortiz hoped to confront Challe with the cruel dilemma either to order the army to fire on fellow Frenchmen, or take sides with them. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1092 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Algeria’s top army commander publicly pledged to disobey de Gaulle — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1088; The Algerian army command openly threatened to replace de Gaulle over self-determination. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1104; The ultras staged the uprising to force the army against de Gaulle — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1092

Related

• Algeria’s top army commander publicly pledged to disobey de Gaulle (similarity 0.95)
• The Algerian army command openly threatened to replace de Gaulle over self-determination. (similarity 0.87)
• Dissident colonels threatened to replace de Gaulle with Challe. (similarity 0.83)
• The ultras staged the uprising to force the army against de Gaulle (similarity 0.82)
• De Gaulle refused to repudiate the army’s force while denying dictatorial intent (similarity 0.81)
• De Gaulle’s intransigent refusal to yield to the riots proved strategically correct (similarity 0.80)
• Challe’s loyalty to the republic collapsed only when de Gaulle shifted toward Algerian self-determination (similarity 0.80)
• De Gaulle let subordinates voice hard-line positions he would later disavow. (similarity 0.80)
• Junior officers saw Algerian independence immediately in de Gaulle’s self-determination speech (similarity 0.80)
• De Gaulle purged Algeria’s army of May 1958 activists (similarity 0.80)
• Ultras believed they could depose de Gaulle as they had raised him (similarity 0.80)
• French metropolitan opinion rallied behind de Gaulle against the Algiers insurgents (similarity 0.80)
• The army viewed any negotiated ceasefire as toppling its war effort in Algeria (similarity 0.80)
• De Gaulle publicly promised the army France would stay in Algeria in early 1960. (similarity 0.80)
• Army officers saw the Algerian war as both career security and a noble cause. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Algeria’s top army commander publicly pledged to disobey de Gaulle #corroborates (0.90) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1088
• The Algerian army command openly threatened to replace de Gaulle over self-determination. #exemplifies (0.75) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1104
• The ultras staged the uprising to force the army against de Gaulle #corroborates (0.60) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1092