Tacit limits require qualitative boundaries amenable to complete abstention

Evidence

In Korea, weapons were limited by the qualitative distinction between atomic and all other; it would surely have been much more difficult to stabilize a tacit acceptance of any limit on size of atomic weapons or selection of targets. {37} No definition of size or target is so obvious and natural that it goes without saying, except for β€œno size, on any target.” American assistance to the French forces in Indochina was persuasively limited to material, not people; and it was appreciated that an enlargement to include, say, air participation could be recognized as limited to air, while it would not be possible to establish a limited amount of air or ground participation. One’s intentions to abstain from ground intervention can be conveyed by the complete withholding of ground forces; one cannot nearly so easily commit some forces and communicate a persuasive limit to the amount that one intends to commit. β€” Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 194

Categorization

  • XREF: The indivisibility of commitment (all or nothing as communicable) parallels hostage mechanics and Godfather-bond credibility in the reader’s Gambetta mapping. β€” connects to: Limits emerge through tacit jockeying and need unique focal qualities. β€” Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 600; Simple discrete salient limits enable coordinated expectations. β€” Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 602; Restrained competition everywhere favors discrete qualitative over graded limits β€” Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 196 (+1 more)

Broader Connections