Stability of mutual-deterrence equilibria depends on the slopes of each side’s response functions
Evidence
We can express each player’s optimum value of B as a function of the other’s, solve the two equations, and deduce the stability conditions for the equilibrium. We can also compute “multipliers” relating each player’s changes of B and R to shifts in the f function or to changes in the A parameters. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 502
Categorization
- XREF: The multiplier structure mirrors Keynesian multiplier analysis and Matthews-type response-equation stability conditions; resonates with the reader’s interest in how institutional equilibria stay stable or explode. — connects to: Deterrence operates on graduated probability, not a binary trip-wire logic — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 460; Mutual deterrence depends on balance stability, not on sheer symmetry. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 529; Rational self-defense adjustments are compatible with both sides still preferring mutual non-attack — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 504 (+2 more)
Related
- Mutual deterrence depends on balance stability, not on sheer symmetry. (similarity 0.88)
- Rational self-defense adjustments are compatible with both sides still preferring mutual non-attack (similarity 0.83)
- Deterrence operates on graduated probability, not a binary trip-wire logic (similarity 0.81)
Broader Connections
- Mutual deterrence depends on balance stability, not on sheer symmetry.
#expands(0.88) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 529