Catastrophic stalemate can result from momentary dominance failure rather than organic crisis

Evidence

What is the country doing? The principal thing the country is doing—in addition to damaging or humiliating Russia—is incurring a painful risk that both it and Russia (and the rest of the world) will be engaged in all-out war in the near future, a war that neither it nor Russia wants. The country is saying in effect, “If you do not get out of Hungary, we may cause an all-out war to occur.” By when must the Russians get out? The sooner they get out, the sooner the risk of war (from this cause) will be terminated or reduced. The country applying the pressure is not saying, “Get out or we shall deliberately start a war.” The decision is not up to them, and does not depend on their displaying the manifest resolution for a final act. The Russians may suppose that the country concerned will do everything it can to prevent total war; but they also have to recognize that with these things flying around, exploding now and then, and with themselves responding in whatever way they feel obliged to, it is not altogether clear that the country concerned, and the Russians, know how to keep total war from occurring. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 444 (#expands, via linked claim)

We can express each player’s optimum value of B as a function of the other’s, solve the two equations, and deduce the stability conditions for the equilibrium. We can also compute “multipliers” relating each player’s changes of B and R to shifts in the f function or to changes in the A parameters. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 502 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Crises lasting decades reveal incurable structural contradictions that resisting forces work to mend.; Dominant classes survive crises by out-maneuvering subordinate groups; Dominance is maintained through unstable equilibria that concede some subordinate interests (+6 more)

Related

• Compellence works by creating shared uncontrollable risk of catastrophe (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Dominance is maintained through unstable equilibria that concede some subordinate interests #complicates (0.75)
• Compellence works by creating shared uncontrollable risk of catastrophe #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 444
• Known capability for failure can stabilize mutual-threat situations #qualifies (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 822
• Stability of mutual-deterrence equilibria depends on the slopes of each side’s response functions #expands (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 502
• Convention equilibria tip rapidly once coordinated defectors reach critical mass #qualifies (0.72) — , The Rod and the Child, 10751
• Sudden escalation of stakes can transform iterated trust into one-shot opportunism #exemplifies (0.72)