Sartre’s denial of ontological being-for-others grounds his hostile intersubjectivity

Evidence

By claiming that being-for-others is not an ontological structure of the for-itself, Sartre sets up a hostile dynamic between myself and the Other whereby each of us seeks our own freedom despite the Other, whose autonomous consciousness constantly threatens the hegemony of my own interpretations of the world we share with one another. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 656

Categorization

• XREF: Traces a causal line from Sartre’s ontology in Being and Nothingness to his account of interpersonal conflict. — connects to: Sartre explains the sexual act as an attempt to capture the Other’s consciousness — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 102; Sartre’s ethic of generous love reproduced Heidegger’s dominating rather than liberating solicitude — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 144; Sartre offers no defense of why existential honesty beats self-deception — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 188 (+9 more)

Broader Connections

• Beauvoir holds Others as essential, challenging Sartre’s ontological individualism #complicates (0.85) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 184