The Sartrean look is an implicit ontological structure, not physical presence

Evidence

Yet the look is of course not to be understood as involving actual physical presence: it is a more fundamental, implicit structure of our being, and it seems to me that the present work makes concrete a certain number of analyses which in Being and Nothingness still had an abstract, paradoxical air about them. … The sense of scandal comes, of course, from the fact that “I” am not personally responsible for what America does, and that it is unjust to condemn the guilty and the innocent alike: but this distance between my self, felt from the inside, and the judgment passed on my objective being from the outside, is what characterizes all forms of this “alienation through other people” (in the Sartrean sense), this basic struggle with the other in which we are always engaged, and in which I am always responsible, I am always guilty, if only on the grounds of my sheer existence itself. — Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form, 587

Categorization

• DEFINE: Clarifies the Sartrean ‘look’ as an implicit structure of being, concrete in the actual work where Being and Nothingness left it abstract.
• XREF: Directs back to Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, refining the earlier analysis of the look. — connects to: Sartre’s denial of ontological being-for-others grounds his hostile intersubjectivity — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 656

Broader Connections

• Sartre’s denial of ontological being-for-others grounds his hostile intersubjectivity #expands (0.82) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 656