Sartre asserted no synthesis is possible between experiencing and knowing the Other

Evidence

Here we have arrived at the end of this exposition. We have learned that the Other’s existence was experienced with evidence in and through the fact of my objectivity. We have seen also that my reaction to my own alienation for the Other was expressed in my grasping the Other as an object. In short, the Other can exist for us in two forms: if I experience him with evidence, I fail to know him; if I know him, if I act upon him, I only reach his being-as-object and his probable existence in the midst of the world. No synthesis of these two forms is possible. (BN, 400) Th e subjectivity and objectivity of the Other are thus disarticulated and resistant to the synthesis of Subject-Object (which is declared in principle impossible), contrary to Sartre’s promise in his phenomenology- a phenomenology that, in principle, did not accept the division of the Subject and Object. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 417

Categorization

• DEFINE: A key Sartrean formula: the subject either experiences the Other’s existence with evidence (and cannot know him) or knows-objectifies him (and loses his existence) — a structural dilemma rather than a mere observation.
• XREF: connects to: Sartre deliberately rejects a resolution to the problem of other minds that Hegel offered — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 260; Sartre’s denial of ontological being-for-others grounds his hostile intersubjectivity — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 656

Broader Connections

• Sartre’s denial of ontological being-for-others grounds his hostile intersubjectivity #expands (0.85) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 656