Sartre deliberately rejects a resolution to the problem of other minds that Hegel offered

Evidence

In his account of the “Look,” unlike Hegel’s account of the Master-Slave relationship in the Phenomenology, there is no resolution to the problem of other consciousnesses. To posit a resolution, argues Sartre, would be to deny the scandal of the plurality of consciousnesses, which must necessarily fracture the dialectic. So rather than a type of totalizing, teleological movement progressing through diff erent “shapes” of consciousness, what the reader encounters in the Sartrean text is the image of an infernal cycle in our relationship to the individualized Other. Th is is his implicit answer to the problem of Hegel’s idealism manifested in the harmonious reconciliation of identical consciousnesses. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 260

Categorization

  • XREF: Connects to the broader Beauvoir-Sartre influence debate and how each manipulates the Hegelian dialectic as a shared methodological tool. — connects to: Sartre politicized perceptual ambiguity by aligning it with Hegelian power and desire. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 67; Sartre rejected Hegelian Other-mediation while Beauvoir endorsed it — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 253; Sartre’s denial of ontological being-for-others grounds his hostile intersubjectivity — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 656 (+1 more)

Broader Connections