Republican freedom can relate to noninterference in various distinct ways.

Evidence

On the one hand, we might try to incorporate some measure of noninterference into our idea of freedom as non-domination. Something like this approach was initially taken by Pettit (1997, 74–7): there he distinguished between factors that “compromise” liberty, and factors that “condition” it. Perhaps my republican freedom is compromised when someone gains arbitrary power over me, but it is merely conditioned when I lack the means or opportunities to make full use of it, and interferences might be one such conditioning factor. On the other hand, we might allow that republican freedom and noninterference are distinct goods, but hold that both are valuable in some degree. We might either regard them as having roughly equal value (Skinner 1998), or we might regard republican liberty as having greater importance than non-interference, other things equal (Viroli 2002, Pettit 2012). — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 29

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Distinguishes Pettit’s ‘compromise vs. condition’ distinction within republican liberty theory.
  • corroborated: 5 independent passages support this claim — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 29
  • XREF: connects to: Republican freedom means absence of dependence on arbitrary power, not non-interference. — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 18; On the republican view, non-arbitrary laws do not reduce freedom but can enhance it. — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 47; Republicans hold liberty as non-domination while liberals define it as mere non-interference. — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 46 (+7 more)

Broader Connections