Freedom as non-domination differs from non-interference by targeting the mere capacity for arbitrary interference.

Evidence

To sum up these reflections, then, freedom as non-domination may seem to do less well than freedom as non-interference in servicing unrestricted choice; after all, it is opposed only to arbitrary interference—specifically, to others having the capacity for such interference—not to interference as such. But freedom as non-domination does much better in three other respects, all of them of intuitively great importance. It promises to do better in delivering a person from uncertainty, and from the associated anxiety and inability to plan; from the need to exercise strategy with the powerful, having to defer to them and anticipate their various moves; and from the subordination that goes with a common awareness that the person is exposed to the possibility of arbitrary interference by another: that there is another who can deploy such interference, even if they are not likely to do so. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 434

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Crisply pins down the two contrasting senses of freedom and why non-domination is the stronger ideal.
  • XREF: connects to: Freedom as non-domination yields benefits beyond those of non-interference. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 407; Freedom as non-domination inherently requires certainty, unlike maximal non-interference. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 420; Subjection can maximize a person’s expected freedom from interference while leaving them vulnerable. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 422 (+9 more)

Broader Connections