In republican theory, law itself creates freedom rather than merely restricting it

Evidence

Imagine for a moment there were no system of domestic criminal and civil law. In this case, citizens would not know where they stood with one another; their interrelations would be governed simply by force—which is to say, by the arbitrary whim of the momentarily stronger party. In order to enjoy some degree of republican freedom, therefore, it is absolutely essential to introduce a domestic legal system so as to govern the citizens’ mutual relations (Lovett 2016a). Notice that, on the republican view of freedom, the laws do not merely protect some freedoms at the expense of others (as on the non-interference view), but rather themselves actually introduce or enable that freedom. On this view, only when their interrelations are mutually governed by a system of public and stable rules is it possible for fellow citizens to enjoy some measure of independence from arbitrary rule (Pettit 1989, 1997, 2012; Spitz 1995; Viroli 2002; Dagger 2009). — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 53

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Sharply distinguishes the republican ‘non-domination’ view of freedom from the liberal ‘non-interference’ view — a core conceptual distinction of the whole theory.
  • XREF: Contrasts directly with liberal/classical positions (e.g., Berlin’s negative liberty) and connects to Pettit’s body of work on civility and freedom as independence. — connects to: Republican freedom means absence of dependence on arbitrary power, not non-interference. — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 18; Republican freedom can relate to noninterference in various distinct ways. — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 29; Republican freedom can be equated with an extended rule of law — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 32 (+14 more)
  • corroborated: 5 independent passages support this claim — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 53

Broader Connections