Reciprocal trust multiplies each party’s incentive to be trustworthy

Evidence

Coleman (1990, 177–80) implicitly includes the trusted’s incentives when he notes that a reciprocal trusting relationship, as in mutual trust in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, is mutually reinforcing for each truster. Why? Because each person now has additional incentive to be trustworthy. I trust you because it is in your interest to do what I trust you to do so long as you want me to do what you trust me to do. If there is some residue beyond rational expectations in one-way trust, there is less role for that residue in this straight, likely self-interested, exchange. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 1016

Categorization

• XREF: Central to the reader’s analytic frame: in the blindness scenario, mutual monitoring collapses so the iterated-prisoner’s-dilemma reinforcement of trust evaporates, explaining the descent into Hobbesian predation. — connects to: Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 166; Trust is encapsulated interest achievable through many incentive mechanisms; Relying on collective trustworthiness is a collective, not merely individual, problem. (+9 more)
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 1016

Broader Connections

• Mutual trust in iterated exchange is selffulfilling through aligned incentives #corroborates (0.88)
• Extending trust can create the trustworthy behavior it presumes #expands (0.78)
• Trust requires both freedom to defect and constraints that make cooperation attractive #qualifies (0.72)