Rational interest-calculation cannot substitute for trust in politics

Evidence

John Dunn criticizes the weakness of those political theories which marginalize trust and makes a forceful case for its centrality in any adequate understanding of politics. Niklas Luhmann draws a conceptual map in which trust is differentiated from related concepts, and tries to capture the specificity of its importance for modern societies. Both Dunn and Luhmann share the view that a rational exploration of other people’s interests can hardly serve as an The essays in the second part refer back to the issues raised in the first by building on specific historical cases. — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 87

Categorization

• XREF: This is a direct anchor for the reader’s central thesis. If rational interest-calculation can’t substitute for trust, then in Saramago the collapse isn’t just monitoring failure (Hardin) but a degradation of the trusting substrate Luhmann distinguishes from mere familiarity.
• QUESTION: Despite the rubric listing trust’s relationship to rationality, this incomplete sentence (‘can hardly serve as…’) begs the question - what does Luhmann say it can serve as? Worth chasing in the source itself.