Prejudiced rationalizations can be socially validated ideology rather than irrationality

Evidence

Thus, Allport overemphasized the role of personality in prejudice, seeing bigots as having weak personalities, as insecure, easily frustrated, and intolerant of ambiguity. A more politically sophisticated psychology now emphasizes individual differences in adherence to group-based ideologies as accounting for individuals’ proneness to prejudice. In an often-cited example, Allport (p. 13) provided a hypothetical conversation illustrating how the prejudiced Mr. X’s stereotypical beliefs about Jews conveniently shift in response to factual counterevidence offered by the tolerant Mr. Y, but always in ways that maintain and justify his antipathy toward Jewish people. For Allport, such slipperiness was evidence of irrational motivational and emotional needs. Contemporary perspectives on prejudice (e.g., Jackman; Jost & Hamilton) interpret such rationalizations in a different light, as well-rehearsed, internally consistent, and socially validated justifications for group inequality. — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 152 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Thus, Allport overemphasized the role of personality in prejudice, seeing bigots as having weak personalities, as insecure, easily frustrated, and intolerant of ambiguity. A more politically sophisticated psychology now emphasizes individual differences in adherence to group-based ideologies as accounting for individuals’ proneness to prejudice. In an often-cited example, Allport (p. 13) provided a hypothetical conversation illustrating how the prejudiced Mr. X’s stereotypical beliefs about Jews conveniently shift in response to factual counterevidence offered by the tolerant Mr. Y, but always in ways that maintain and justify his antipathy toward Jewish people. For Allport, such slipperiness was evidence of irrational motivational and emotional needs. Contemporary perspectives on prejudice (e.g., Jackman; Jost & Hamilton) interpret such rationalizations in a different light, as well-rehearsed, internally consistent, and socially validated justifications for group inequality. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 152 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

This work builds on the notion that people form social categories on the basis of similarity and related cues but also go further to develop intuitive theories and explanations about how and why members of a social category belong together. These explanations often take tautological, essentialistic forms. Anti-Semitism, for example, invariably “finds its rationalization in some presumed aspect of ‘Jewish essence’” (Allport, 1954/1979, p. 195). The same perceiver may criticize Jews (or Asians, or whomever) at one convenient moment for being inherently “clannish” and at other times for intrusively forcing themselves upon others. The categorization function explains why stereotypes are undifferentiated and overgeneralized; the justification function explains why they are so often illogical and contrary to fact. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1371 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim
  • XREF: connects to: Rationality emerges from taboo rules rather than rules arising from rational reflection — Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 135; Objectification becomes bourgeois rationalization when objectivity remains unfree. — Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from…, 267; Under total mobilization even genocidal calculus becomes rational self-justification — Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the…, 237 (+18 more)

Broader Connections