Arab-Kabyle rivalry forced collective revolutionary leadership from the start

Evidence

Yet it marked the seeds of dissension within the revolutionary camp that were to dog it incessantly through the war, and beyond. At the same time it was to have its bearing on the supreme leadership of the revolutionaries. The neuf historiques, deeply admiring of Ho Chi Minh at that time, would have liked initially to appoint from their ranks a similarly prestigious figure to head them; but, while there was no candidate of obviously outstanding stature, to have selected either an Arab or a Kabyle might have run the grave risk of alienating one or other race. Thus the principle of collective leadership was adopted right from the beginning, and it was to constitute a vitally important feature of the revolution all the way through to 1962. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 240 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

In the past, the Kabyle and the Arab had little love for each other, and — in the best colonial tradition — it was often the policy of French administrators to set one off against the other. More orthodox in religion than the Kabyles, the Arabs were at the same time perhaps more supple in their mental processes, and shrewder businessmen. As townsmen and lowlanders they had had the most contact with French culture, and had also suffered, directly, the most in that it was largely their patrimonial lands that had come within the grasp of the colons. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 150 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Colonial divide-and-rule pitted Kabyles against Arabs in Algeria; Kabyle-Arab rivalry forced the FLN into a collective leadership without a supreme chief — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 240; French colonial policy deliberately divided Kabyle against Arab populations — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 150 (+2 more)

Related

• Kabyle-Arab rivalry forced the FLN into a collective leadership without a supreme chief (similarity 0.96)
• The FLN avoided racial schism by adopting collective leadership (similarity 0.89)
• The F.L.N. feared a sectarian Arab-Kabyle split exploit by the French. (similarity 0.87)
• Colonial divide-and-rule pitted Kabyles against Arabs in Algeria (similarity 0.84)
• The Arab-Kabyle split was the F.L.N.’s chief nightmare exploited by the French. (similarity 0.84)
• French colonial policy deliberately divided Kabyle against Arab populations (similarity 0.83)
• Si Chérif’s Arab-Kabyle feud defected a whole katiba to the French (similarity 0.82)
• Interior-exterior rivalry among leaders threatened the F.L.N. as much as French pressure. (similarity 0.81)
• F.L.N. power struggles intensified as independence approached. (similarity 0.80)
• Post-independence leadership rivalries turned lethal within the F.L.N. (similarity 0.79)
• Algerian revolutionaries split between moderates and hard-liners over the pied noir presence (similarity 0.79)
• Post-independence rivalry among Muslim leaders exceeded wartime bitterness against France (similarity 0.79)
• The Algiers defeat exposed a fatal interior-exterior rift in F.L.N. leadership (similarity 0.79)
• Boumedienne’s army challenge split the F.L.N. leadership into doctrinaire socialist and old-guard factions. (similarity 0.79)
• The Algerian negotiating camp was deeply split between Boumedienne’s hard-liners and Krim’s politicos. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Kabyle-Arab rivalry forced the FLN into a collective leadership without a supreme chief #corroborates (0.95) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 240
• The F.L.N. feared a sectarian Arab-Kabyle split exploit by the French. #expands (0.75)
• French colonial policy deliberately divided Kabyle against Arab populations #expands (0.60) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 150
• F.L.N. power struggles intensified as independence approached. #expands (0.45)