F.L.N. commanders risked being killed by their own side if they defected

Evidence

The next hesitation of the F.L.N. leaders stemmed from an anxiety not to “desolidarise” themselves from their fellow combatants. They wanted to see Ben Bella to canvass his support; they wanted to go to Tunis to press their case there. Both propositions were refused by de Gaulle, and were indeed quite unrealistic; Ben Bella would have been unpersuadable; once in Tunis the F.L.N. would never have permitted them to return. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1184

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the internal F.L.N. violence against defectors and rival factions noted in earlier hostage and wilaya chapters. — connects to: Post-independence leadership rivalries turned lethal within the F.L.N.; Internal dissent was the F.L.N.’s greatest enemy while secrecy was its greatest strength — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 401; The F.L.N. executed rebel commanders who had negotiated secretly with de Gaulle — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1192

Related

• Post-independence leadership rivalries turned lethal within the F.L.N. (similarity 0.85)
• The F.L.N. executed rebel commanders who had negotiated secretly with de Gaulle (similarity 0.82)
• F.L.N. leaders imprisoned in France signed documents supporting Abane’s execution. (similarity 0.80)
• F.L.N. deliberately sabotaged its own negotiating openings to deny de Gaulle international credit (similarity 0.80)
• Interior F.L.N. commanders sought a separate peace that bypassed the G.P.R.A. (similarity 0.79)
• Internal dissent was the F.L.N.’s greatest enemy while secrecy was its greatest strength (similarity 0.79)
• Interior-exterior rivalry among leaders threatened the F.L.N. as much as French pressure. (similarity 0.78)