Scholars have documented many functional strategies to insulate policies
Evidence
Indeed, political scientists, economists, and sociologists have generated a vast and varied literature exploring the many different means by which political actors seek to insulate power holders and policies against downstream political change without recourse to formal entrenchment devices. These functional entrenchment strategies take a number of different forms. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 190
Categorization
- XREF: Points to the interdisciplinary literature (political science, economics, sociology) the reader would draw on for mechanisms of institutional persistence. — connects to: Political actors insulate favored policies by refashioning institutional context across many domains — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 25; Politically dominant groups knowingly design more insulated institutions. — Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi, Endogenous Political Institutions, 162; Some policies are self-consciously designed to entrench themselves and their creators. (+5 more)
Broader Connections
- Some policies are self-consciously designed to entrench themselves and their creators.
#corroborates(0.85) - Political actors entrench power through functional mechanisms as readily as formal legal rules
#corroborates(0.83) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 42 - Functional entrenchment can be legitimate when it insulates sound policies against short-term reversal
#qualifies(0.82) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 393 - Strategic policy choices can entrench outcomes without formal rule changes
#expands(0.80) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 508 - Political actors insulate favored policies by refashioning institutional context across many domains
#exemplifies(0.78) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 25 - Entrenched policy outcomes can be locked in through either electoral or legislative means
#expands(0.76) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 161 - Functional entrenchment is hard to police because policy and entrenchment motives overlap inextricably
#qualifies(0.75) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 427 - Politically dominant groups knowingly design more insulated institutions.
#expands(0.74) — Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi, Endogenous Political Institutions, 162