Polarization research distinguishes idea-based from affective polarization

Evidence

The same pattern of conceptual ambiguity can be observed regarding the definition of polarization along two axes. First, there was significant diversity in terms of the type of polarization. Polarization typically consists of two types: idea-based and affective polarization, essentially differentiating between polarization of substantive ideas or preferences on specific political issues (i.e., polarization of ideas), and polarization of people themselves based on their feelings, emotions and identities (i.e., affective polarization) (McCoy et al., 2018; Tappin and McKay, 2019; Reiljan, 2020; Boxell et al., 2022). — Didier Caluwaerts et al., Deliberation and Polarization, 87

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the two canonical types of polarization and their distinguishing axis.
• XREF: connects to: Deliberation reduces affective polarization but often increases idea-based polarization. — Didier Caluwaerts et al., Deliberation and Polarization: A…, 107; Deliberation reduces polarization only under specific deliberative frameworks — Didier Caluwaerts et al., Deliberation and Polarization: A…, 16; Affective factors, not knowledge gain, drive contact’s prejudice-reducing effect — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 1831 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• Deliberation reduces affective polarization but often increases idea-based polarization. #expands (0.95) — Didier Caluwaerts et al., Deliberation and Polarization, 107
• Polarization similarity hides distinct causes requiring opposite interventions #expands (0.88) — Cailin O’Connor and James Owen Weatherall, The Misinformation Age, 311
• Deliberation reduces polarization only under specific deliberative frameworks #qualifies (0.85) — Didier Caluwaerts et al., Deliberation and Polarization, 16
• Affective factors, not knowledge gain, drive contact’s prejudice-reducing effect #exemplifies (0.78) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1831