Deliberation reduces polarization only under specific deliberative frameworks

Evidence

One notable exception, however, is the literature on deliberative democracy, which in its varied forms is considered a potential cure for political polarization (see e.g., Esterling et al., 2021; Fishkin et al., 2021; McAvoy and McAvoy, 2021). By allowing citizens to exchange arguments and viewpoints on political issues in group, processes of communicative interactions can have strong conflict-mitigating effects: they can foster opinion changes (thereby overcoming idea-based polarization) (Grönlund et al., 2015; Smith and Setälä, 2018), and improve relations between diametrically opposed groups (thereby tackling affective forms of polarization) (Gastil et al., 2010). … Research on this topic has gained momentum in recent years, and there are solid reasons to assume that deliberation could reduce polarization (see e.g., Grönlund et al., 2015; Strandberg et al., 2019). However, these results conflict with social psychological and communication studies which find that communicative encounters between individuals can lead to further polarization and even group think. For instance, research on group decision-making as far back as the 1970’s (Myers and Lamm, 1976; p. 603; see also Lamm and Myers, 1978) has found that when individuals convene in groups to discuss collective issues and come up with recommendations, their decisions were usually more extreme than what each of the individuals preferred (Forsyth, 2010; p. 333– 334, see also Sunstein, 2000, 2002, 2009). As those forms of group discussions arguably differ from deliberation within a deliberative democracy framework, the question is then no longer whether group deliberation reduces polarization, but rather which conceptualizations of deliberation can have these effects. — Didier Caluwaerts et al., Deliberation and Polarization, 16

Once again, this discussion might seem conceptual, but the implications are important. The manner in which one measures polarization, as one group becoming on average more extreme or two (or more) groups growing increasingly apart, is crucial in understanding the actual potential of deliberation as a depolarization strategy. — Didier Caluwaerts et al., Deliberation and Polarization, 89

A third finding is that deliberation’s effect on polarization is contingent on many factors. We found that deliberation can decrease polarization albeit under the right deliberative conditions. Those conditions seem to be the group composition (with heterogeneous groups being more likely to depolarize than homogeneous groups), facilitation (with facilitated groups being much more likely to depolarize than non-facilitated groups), and interaction mode (with face-to-face deliberation being more likely to depolarize mediated (online) deliberation). This echoes an oftheard finding in deliberative research that deliberative design matters a great deal. — Didier Caluwaerts et al., Deliberation and Polarization, 138

Categorization

  • DEFINE: This frames the chapter’s central question as whether framing predicts effect.
  • XREF: Connects to Sunstein’s law of group polarization and deliberative democracy debates. — connects to: Facilitated deliberation depolarizes participants while unfacilitated deliberation polarizes them. — Didier Caluwaerts et al., Deliberation and Polarization: A…, 121; Mediated rather than face-to-face deliberation tends to polarize groups — Didier Caluwaerts et al., Deliberation and Polarization: A…, 123; Depolarization requires deliberation framed by deliberative-democracy conditions. — Didier Caluwaerts et al., Deliberation and Polarization: A…, 136 (+6 more)
  • corroborated: 3 independent passages support this claim — Didier Caluwaerts et al., Deliberation and Polarization: A…, 16; Didier Caluwaerts et al., Deliberation and Polarization: A…, 89; Didier Caluwaerts et al., Deliberation and Polarization: A…, 138

Broader Connections