Polarization and motivated bias differ from conspiracism in being corrigible

Evidence

This account and others like it attribute the erosion in large part to political polarization and back-and-forth charges of partisan bias. Since the start of mass survey research, political scientists have learned how partisan bias forms a perceptual screen that distorts people’s view of the world. So does motivated reasoning and confirmation bias, which we discussed in chapter 2. All this is problematic for democratic politics, but it can be defended against. Its worst distortions are corrigible. In principle, political polarization can abate, bias can be disclosed, and facticity can be restored. — Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum, A Lot of People Are Saying, 263

Categorization

• DEFINE: Draws a boundary between ordinary partisan bias (correctable) and conspiracism — the key distinction the whole book rests on.
• XREF: connects to: Prior polarization and weakened parties preconditioned conspiracism’s delegitimating effects — Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum, A Lot of People Are Saying: The New…, 104; Corporate climate misinformation differs categorically from conspiracist fabulation — Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum, A Lot of People Are Saying: The New…, 245; Conspiracism causes a deeper rift than partisan polarization — Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum, A Lot of People Are Saying: The New…, 293 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Polarization does not statistically predict conspiracy talk #contradicts (0.80) — Joseph E. Uscinski and Joseph M. Parent, American Conspiracy Theories, 667
• Conspiracism causes a deeper rift than partisan polarization #qualifies (0.75) — Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum, A Lot of People Are Saying, 293