Suggestive background stories can shift which equilibria players settle on

Evidence

A “scenario” might, for example, identify one of the players as “aggressor”; it might give the outcomes of previous plays of the same game by other players; it might give a background story that would tend to identify some particular division of the terrain as corresponding to an original “status quo”; or it might seem to attach a kind of moral claim of one of the players to particular parts of the board. These background data would have no influence on the logical or mathematical structure of the game; they would be intended to have no force except power of suggestion. Again, one might set up the board so that on the first play it corresponds to the way it stood in the middle of the same game as played earlier by two other players, and see whether the outcome can be affected by informing the players of what the starting lineup was in that earlier game. If players tend to develop “norms” based on the static configuration of the game as they appreciate it at the outset, it may be possible to distort those norms by providing, in a completely “non-authoritative” way, a background story that suggestively indicates some other hypothetical starting point. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 380

Categorization

• XREF: Focal-point/framing effect — status quo anchoring via pure suggestion parallels how Mafia narratives and reputations anchor the negotiation baseline Bonasera is offered. — connects to: Players may manufacture ex-post reasons to justify coordinating on a salient equilibrium — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 682; A biased mediator can be accepted when clue-rich situations block focal points — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 236; A mediator can create focal points through dramatic suggestion — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 334 (+3 more)
• SEED: Angle: how pure ‘power of suggestion’ scenes in negotiations — status-quo framing, precedent-citing, moral-claim narrative — structure outcomes in any market where enforcement is private.

Related

• Players may manufacture ex-post reasons to justify coordinating on a salient equilibrium (similarity 0.79)
• A mediator can create focal points through dramatic suggestion (similarity 0.79)
• A biased mediator can be accepted when clue-rich situations block focal points (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Players can derive coordination signals from labels and connotations beyond payoff structure #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 678
• Foot-binding and FGC persisted as game-theoretic equilibria, not cultural preference #exemplifies (0.78) — , The Rod and the Child, 7331
• Particular encounters acquire symbolic weight because players know reputation is at stake #exemplifies (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 381