Mutual invulnerability raises the credibility of limited retaliation

Evidence

The threat of massive retaliation, if “massive” is interpreted to mean unlimited retaliation, does indeed lose credibility with the loss of our hope that a skillfully conducted all-out strike might succeed in precluding counter-retaliation. But if we were ever to consider limited or graduated reprisals as a means of putting pressure on the Russians to desist from actions intolerable to us, or to consider extending a limited local war inside Russian borders in a way that maintained the presence of local military action but was really intended to work through the sanction of civilian pain and the threat of more, this kind of retaliatory action, and the threat of it, might enjoy increased credibility with a reduction in the vulnerability of both sides’ strategic forces. It does, paradoxically, for the same reason that all kinds of limited war might become less inhibited as the possibility of all-out surprise attack became unavailable. The risk involved in a bit of less-than-massive retaliation should be less than it is now because the fear of an all-out strike in return should be a good deal less. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 585

Categorization

• XREF: The graduated-reprisal escalation ladder here parallels the incremental commitment mechanics the reader tracks in Schelling’s broader credible-commitment framework. — connects to: Mutual fear can amplify exogenously into runaway escalation via feedback loops. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 485; Deterrence rests on surviving retaliation capacity, not on existing destructive capacity. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 528; Mutually invulnerable retaliation forces neutralize each other’s deterrent role — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 582 (+3 more)

Related

• Mutually invulnerable retaliation forces neutralize each other’s deterrent role (similarity 0.87)
• Deterrence rests on surviving retaliation capacity, not on existing destructive capacity. (similarity 0.85)
• Judging mutual invulnerability requires comparing two distinct deterrent threats (similarity 0.84)
• Threat credibility depends on the other party recognizing the retaliation formula (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Judging mutual invulnerability requires comparing two distinct deterrent threats #expands (0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 587
• Threat credibility depends on the other party recognizing the retaliation formula #qualifies (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 256
• Distributed lethal systems fabricate irresponsibility by diluting causal attribution. #complicates (0.72)