Moral typecasting may reflect a general person-perception tendency.
Evidence
Another question is whether the phenomenon of typecasting—perceiving people in mutually exclusive categories—is unique to the moral domain, or characterizes person perception more broadly. … Moral perception is clearly a subset of person perception more generally, and it is likely that viewing people through the lens of one of two mutually exclusive categories should lead to typecasting. — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 160
Categorization
- XREF: Parallels the reader’s hypothesis that recategorizing a group as ‘ideological’ vs. ‘religious’ produces a measurable shift — typecasting as a general perceptual template. — connects to: Perceiving someone as a moral agent may preclude perceiving them as a moral patient — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting: Divergent…, 21; Perceptions of moral agency are studied across varied human and celebrity targets. — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting: Divergent…, 65; Moral typecasting operates independently of whether actions are good or bad — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting: Divergent…, 57 (+3 more)
- corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting: Divergent…, 160
Broader Connections
- Perceiving someone as a moral agent reduces perceived moral patiency.
#exemplifies(0.82) — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 1 - Moral typecasting operates independently of whether actions are good or bad
#expands(0.80) — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 57 - Moral typecasting predicts neutral agents are victimized, contradicting just-world logic
#exemplifies(0.78) — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 105 - Moral typecasting theory divides targets into agents, patients, and neutral roles for experimental comparison
#expands(0.72) — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 141