Perceiving someone as a moral agent may preclude perceiving them as a moral patient

Evidence

This dimensional analysis of moral perception makes it tempting to conclude that perceptions of an entity’s moral agency and moral patiency are independent. After all, if these dimensions are orthogonal in factor analysis, it makes sense—at first blush, anyway—to conclude that they are statistically and psychologically unrelated as well. However, this conclusion seems to clash with everyday observation. It is hard to imagine Tiny Tim from Dickens’s A Christmas Carol (Dickens, 1843/2001), for example, as morally responsible for much of anything; the crippled child is a quintessential moral patient, not an agent. Likewise, it is difficult to see prototypical moral agents, such as Adolph Hitler or Mohandas Gandhi, as vulnerable, sensitive to harm, or even receptive to benefits or help. These examples hint at a broad possibility—that perceptions of moral patiency and agency may be inversely related. Seeing someone as a moral agent may preclude viewing them as a moral patient, and seeing someone as a moral patient may preclude viewing them as a moral agent. — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 21

Moral agents and patients imply each other. Surely one can evaluate the Dalai Lama as a stronger moral agent, and as a lesser moral patient, without viewing him as part of a specific dyad. Yet in perceiving him as a strong moral agent, there seems to be something left unfinished, another person who would make his agency appear more understandable and complete. He can be understood most clearly if paired with a moral patient-in his case, This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 118

Categorization

• DEEPTHINKING: The inverse-relation claim is the core theoretical engine behind moral typecasting — the mechanism the reader would need to test for a religious-vs-ideological recategorization.
• SEED: Angle for the reader: if agency and patiency are inversely linked, framing a religious minority as an ‘ideological’ actor is itself a move that strips perceived vulnerability — the audience for their recategorization study is already latent here.
• DEFINE: Lays out the relational/dyadic core of moral typecasting theory.
• corroborated: 4 independent passages support this claim — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting: Divergent…, 21; Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting: Divergent…, 118
• XREF: connects to: Perceiving someone as a moral agent reduces perceived moral patiency. — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting: Divergent…, 1; Mere association with a moral agent or patient shifts a target’s perceived moral standing — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting: Divergent…, 128; Casting someone as a moral agent reduces perceived sensitivity to pain — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting: Divergent…, 88 (+6 more)

Broader Connections

• Casting someone as a moral agent reduces perceived sensitivity to pain #corroborates (0.93) — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 88
• Moral agent and moral patient categories are mutually exclusive yet overlapping. #corroborates (0.88) — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 160
• Mere association with a moral agent or patient shifts a target’s perceived moral standing #expands (0.85) — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 128
• Moral typecasting may reflect a general person-perception tendency. #expands (0.82) — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 160
• Moral typecasting theory divides targets into agents, patients, and neutral roles for experimental comparison #expands (0.78) — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 141
• Experimental vignettes decouple general agency from moral agency in perception of a target #complicates (0.73) — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 111