Moral agency specifically, not general agency, reduces perceived moral patiency.

Evidence

The moral typecasting hypothesis suggests that it is specifically perceptions of moral agency that reduce perceptions of moral patiency, however, so it is worth testing this link. To do so, we conducted two studies examining the relative influence of moral agency and general agency on perceptions of moral patiency. In Study 4a, we presented participants with Michael and Jeffrey (as in Study 3), and we described Jeffrey as more agentic in either a general or moral domain. We expected that people would see Jeffrey as relatively agentic in both conditions but only in the moral agency condition would there be an effect on moral patiency as indicated by a relative decrease in Jeffrey’s sensitivity to pain. In Study 4b, we drew the contrast even more sharply by portraying Michael as higher in general agency than Jeffrey, and Jeffrey as higher in (evil) moral agency than Michael. We then measured the relative perceptions of the moral patiency of Michael and Jeffrey by assessing which of them is a more likely victim. It was predicted that Jeffrey’s greater moral agency would lead him to be perceived less of a patient than the generally agentic Michael. — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 99 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• recurring: this claim recurs 2 times within its source
• XREF: connects to: Perceived moral agency and perceived moral patiency vary inversely across targets — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting: Divergent…, 39; Moral typecasting operates independently of whether actions are good or bad — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting: Divergent…, 57; Only moral agency, not instrumental competence, suppresses perceived patiency — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting: Divergent…, 99

Related

• Only moral agency, not instrumental competence, suppresses perceived patiency (similarity 0.96)
• Perceiving someone as a moral agent reduces perceived moral patiency. (similarity 0.93)
• Perceived moral agency uniquely suppresses perceived victimhood, separable from general agency (similarity 0.91)
• Moral agency and patiency perceptions are inversely related, not linked. (similarity 0.91)
• Perceived moral agency and perceived patiency may trade off inversely even at extreme levels. (similarity 0.91)
• Moral typecasting operates independently of whether actions are good or bad (similarity 0.91)
• Enhancing perceived patiency reduces perceived agency, and vice versa (similarity 0.89)
• Moral agency and patiency are distinct from general agency and patiency. (similarity 0.88)
• People more readily punish good moral agents than moral patients. (similarity 0.88)
• Perceived moral agency and perceived moral patiency vary inversely across targets (similarity 0.88)
• Moral agency and patiency are perceived along continuous dimensions rather than as binary categories. (similarity 0.87)
• Moral agent and moral patient categories are mutually exclusive yet overlapping. (similarity 0.84)
• Perceived moral agency is measured as deviation from moral neutrality, not direction. (similarity 0.84)
• Moral patiency rests on a target’s perceived capacity for pain and pleasure. (similarity 0.83)
• Experimental vignettes decouple general agency from moral agency in perception of a target (similarity 0.83)

Broader Connections

• Only moral agency, not instrumental competence, suppresses perceived patiency #corroborates (0.97) — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 99