Elite skill and pragmatism, not ideology, drove successful party transformation.

Evidence

First, such categories are fluid: Not only do they change their relative meaning depending on the temporal and political context, but many party leaders fell into different categories over time, depending on the issue involved. Second, strong ideological commitments were both fleeting and rare, especially where the parties had engaged in negotiation and reform. And, without concomitant political skill, even the most committed reformists could achieve little, as we will see. Instead, the cumulative skills, experiences, and pragmatism of the new elites, gained earlier in the communist parties, allowed them both to envision and to implement transformation. — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 392

Categorization

Category: Contrarian or Surprising Claims

• SEED: Implication for the reader’s core question: professed conviction predicted little of actual transformation behavior — skills and cumulative experience mattered more. A possible essay angle on how competence-based accounts displace ideology-based accounts of institutional survival.
• XREF: Relates to the reader’s question of whether professed conviction diverges from actual behavior; connects to communist successor party survival literature and to the finding that party leaders self-described as reformist achieved little without skill.

Related

• Ideological commitment proved fleeting while skills drove party transformation (similarity 0.93)
• Elite skill, not ideology, drove communist party organizational regeneration (similarity 0.91)
• Elite skills and party cohesion drive successful postcommunist transformation. (similarity 0.86)
• Elite skill level determined how decisively communist parties reformed at their congresses (similarity 0.86)
• Organizational transformation hinged on elite skills and a usable past (similarity 0.85)
• Elite skills accumulate even when reform efforts fail (similarity 0.83)
• Centralized parties with experienced elites adapted best to postcommunist elections. (similarity 0.83)
• Mid-level elites drove post-communist party transformation. (similarity 0.83)
• Successful party transformation requires early, sequenced organizational change before programmatic change. (similarity 0.83)
• Policy-reform experience and prior opposition negotiations gave elites portable skills later rewarded in democracy. (similarity 0.82)
• Recruitment openness and internal pluralism determined which communist elites could later transform their parties. (similarity 0.82)
• Elites socialized in rigid party apparats cannot lead genuine reform (similarity 0.81)
• Successful party reform requires new leaders able to centralize decisively and rapidly. (similarity 0.81)
• Party elites, not members or middle managers, drive post-communist party transformation. (similarity 0.81)
• Lacking portable skills made new party elites hostage to conservative members and orthodox committees. (similarity 0.81)