Low-guilt states mask opposite potentials for future guilt escalation under new deterrents.

Evidence

One interesting implication of the theory of emotional intensity is that it predicts low levels of emotional arousal when deterrents are relatively low or relatively high. Despite resulting from different levels of deterrents, similar levels of emotional intensity represent similar levels of motivational arousal, and thus will result in similar levels of effort spent attempting to fulfi ll the function of the emotion. One difference between the low emotional intensity experienced under low and high deterrence is worth noting—a person experiencing low guilt because deterrents are low has potential for a greater intensity of guilt if new deterrents are encountered. In contrast, a person experiencing low guilt because deterrence requires a level of emotional intensity that surpasses its potential would continue to feel little guilt if additional deterrents are encountered. — Michael T. Schmitt, Daniel A. Miller, Nyla R. Branscombe, and Jack W. Brehm, The Difficulty of Making Reparations…, 71

Categorization

• XREF: Reinforces the institutional-apology-asymmetry claim: whether low collective guilt is ‘shallow’ (repairable) or ‘saturated’ (impervious) changes the policy meaning of observed guilt. — connects to: Demanding too much or too little both suppress dominant-group guilt. — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 616; Conflict escalation lowers group-based guilt and raises exonerating cognitions over time. — Sonia Roccas and Yechiel Klar and Ido Liviatan, The Paradox of Group-Based Guilt: Modes…, 87; Group identification can simultaneously raise and lower group-based guilt. — Sonia Roccas and Yechiel Klar and Ido Liviatan, The Paradox of Group-Based Guilt: Modes…, 25 (+2 more)
• QUESTION: This falsifiable asymmetry — shallow vs. saturated low guilt — could be tested by presenting additional deterrents after a low-guilt induction.

Broader Connections

• Conflict escalation lowers group-based guilt and raises exonerating cognitions over time. #exemplifies (0.78) — Sonia Roccas and Yechiel Klar and Ido Liviatan, The Paradox of Group-Based Guilt, 87
• Group identification can simultaneously raise and lower group-based guilt. #expands (0.75) — Sonia Roccas and Yechiel Klar and Ido Liviatan, The Paradox of Group-Based Guilt, 25
• Moral justification erases guilt yet leaves intrusive remnants that demand suppression #corroborates (0.73)
• Demanding too much or too little both suppress dominant-group guilt. #expands (0.72) — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 616
• Collective guilt peaks at moderate rather than low or high reparation difficulty #complicates (0.72) — Michael T. Schmitt, Daniel A. Miller, Nyla R. Branscombe, and Jack W. Brehm, The Difficulty of Making Reparations…, 4