Moral justification erases guilt yet leaves intrusive remnants that demand suppression

Evidence

The power of ideology to dispel moral restraint is illustrated in cold-blooded assassinations. Sean O’Callaghan, the young IRA militant, entered a pub and shot at close range a Catholic police inspector erroneously rumored to be abusing IRA prisoners in detention centers (O’Callaghan, 1998). In reflecting on the killing he disclaimed any wrongdoing: “I had done no wrong. I had not committed a crime, a sin. I had no reason to feel guilty.” The worthy purpose was his moral exoneration: “I was fighting for a righteous cause” (O’Callaghan, 1998). Although remorseless about the assassination, he experienced a residual live-with-yourself problem. He was haunted by an intrusive thought—“You’re going to have to pay for this someday”—which he tried to suppress: “I pushed that troublesome thought away. ‘Get your act together, you halfwit,’ I told myself.” — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 2216 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Guilt from endangering loved ones defined the real moral landscape of resistance — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist CafĂ©: Freedom,
, 513; Conscience operates as inward self-cruelty, not mere restraint — Wendy Brown, In the Ruins of Neoliberalism: The Rise
, 282; Guilt works as motivation whose intensity tracks the cost of required action. — Michael T. Schmitt, Daniel A. Miller, Nyla R. Branscombe, and Jack W. Brehm, The Difficulty of Making Reparations
, 61 (+8 more)

Broader Connections