Inductive legal generalization produces workable probabilities rather than absolute truths.

Evidence

Formulating a generalization in the law, that is, enumerating a series of tight holdings of cases (legal rules) to create a generalized legal precept (legal principle), is at best a logic of probabilities. We accept the result, not because it is an absolute truth, like a proposition in mathematics, but because it gives our results a certain hue of credibility. The process is designed to yield workable and tested premises, rather than truths. — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 339

Categorization

  • DEFINE: DEFINE
  • XREF: XREF — connects to: Judicial rules should not be applied to dryly logical extremes — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 144; Permissible jury inferences require a logical probability connecting basic facts to ultimate facts — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 217; Legal reasoning yields probability rather than absolute mathematical truths — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 242 (+18 more)
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 339

Broader Connections