Legitimacy of state power rests on contestability, not actual consent

Evidence

Happily, a little reflection shows that what is required for nonarbitrariness in the exercise of a certain power is not actual consent to that sort of power but the permanent possibility of effectively contesting it. The state will not interfere on an arbitrary basis, by our earlier account, so far as its interference has to be guided by certain relevant interests and ideas and those interests and ideas are shared by those affected. This does not mean that the people must have actively consented to the arrangements under which the state acts. But what it does mean is that it must always be possible for people in the society, no matter what corner they occupy, to contest the assumption that the guiding interests and ideas really are shared and, if the challenge proves sustainable, to alter the pattern of state activity. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 325

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the core Pettit republican criterion: non-arbitrary power requires permanent possibility of contestation, not consent.
• XREF: Links to the reader’s civic-republican research on institutions building trust and solidarity without external threat — contestability is the mechanism that lets diverse groups share a state non-coercively. — connects to: Non-arbitrary governance needs contestability rather than actual consent — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 839; Power cannot self-realize but depends on societal-structural conditions for legitimacy; Contestation, not collective will, legitimately constrains discretionary power. — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 59 (+5 more)

Broader Connections

• Non-arbitrary governance needs contestability rather than actual consent #corroborates (0.95) — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 839
• Contestation, not collective will, legitimately constrains discretionary power. #corroborates (0.95) — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 59
• The State is domination plus the active consent of the ruled #contradicts (0.80)
• Legal legitimacy is structural contingency, not shared conviction #expands (0.75)
• Power cannot self-realize but depends on societal-structural conditions for legitimacy #expands (0.72)
• Legitimacy can be derived from constitutional practices rather than from justifications. #complicates (0.72) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 15