Pragmatic law judges rules by their consequences, not their origins.

Evidence

A related point is that law is forward-looking. This point is implicit in an instrumental concept of law-which is the pragmatic concept of law, law as the servant of human needs, and is in sharp contrast to Aristotle’s influential theory of corrective justice. That theory is quintessentially backward-looking. The function of law as corrective justice is to restore a preexisting equilibrium of rights, while in Cardozo’s account “[n]ot the origin, but the goal, is the main thing. There can be no wisdom in the choice of a path unless we know where it will lead … The rule that functions well produces a title deed to recognition … [T]he final principle of selection for judges … is one of fitness to an end.” … The “title deed” sentence is particularly noteworthy; it is a rebuke to formalist theories that require that for a law to be valid it must be “pedigreed” by being shown to derive from some authoritative source. — Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 38

Categorization

• DEFINE: Contrasts the instrumental/pragmatic concept of law with Aristotle’s backward-looking corrective justice, defining the pivot around which the whole pragmatic theory of law turns.
• XREF: Connects to the pedigree-vs-function debate in legal positivism (Hart vs. Dworkin, Kelsen) and to Law and Economics’ own efficiency criterion. — connects to: Obeying rules, precedent, and authority means deciding against one’s own best judgment. — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 15; Pragmatism requires judges to adapt law to social change, not freeze it. — Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 123; Literal application of legal rules sometimes produces absurd against-purpose outcomes — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 284 (+7 more)

Broader Connections

• Pragmatism requires judges to adapt law to social change, not freeze it. #expands (0.70) — Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 123
• Literal application of legal rules sometimes produces absurd against-purpose outcomes #exemplifies (0.60) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 284
• Judicial rules should not be applied to dryly logical extremes #corroborates (0.60) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 144